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INDIVIDUAL FILING IN THE PERSONAL
INCOME TAX: PROLEGOMENA TO
FUTURE DISCUSSION
MICHAEL J. MCINTYRE t
The jointfiling rule of thepersonal income tax has recently
come under increasing attack. Critics assail many alleged de-
fects of the system, especially the so-called "tax on marriage,"
under which some married couplespay more tax than unmarried
couples with equal income. In this Article, Professor McIntyre
comes to the defense of the jointfiling system and challenges the
assertion that the present system should be replaced with an in-
dividualfiling regime. Professor McIntyre argues that the joint
filing rule is fundamentally sound on theoretical grounds be-
cause of the impact that the pooling of income has on the mate-
rial well-being of married persons. Moreover, Professor
McIntyre suggests that an individual filing system necessarily
would create inequities, including its own version of the "tax on
marriage, " that could be avoided under a reformed system of
jointfiling.
Many married persons, probably most, pool some or all of their
individual income sources with their spouses.' The exact sharing pat-
terns of couples are unknown and probably unknowable, because shar-
ing is often an unconscious act unaccompanied by careful record
keeping.2 If we consider the major items in a family budget, neverthe-
less, we can plausibly argue that extensive sharing is virtually unavoid-
able. In most marital partnerships, the distribution of benefits from
t Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. A.B. 1964, Providence; J.D. 1969,
Harvard.
For a popular summary of many of the arguments made in this paper, see McIntyre,
Prolegomena to Future Argumentsfor Individual Filing in the Personal Income Tax, TAX NOTES,
June 18, 1979, at 763-67.
1. For a summary of the empirical basis for the widespread belief that married persons pool
income, see Thorson, An Analysis of the Sources of Continued Controversy over the Tax Treatment
ofFamily Income, 18 NAT'L TAX J. 113 (1965).
2. Suppose we observe two lovers in a soda parlor drinking through straws from a single ice
cream soda. We understand easily enough that sharing is taking place, but we cannot determine
how much soda each party is getting. Any attempt to measure the flows through the straws scien-
tifically would require an intrusion into the scene that would undoubtedly bias the results. Ques-
tioning the lovers, moreover, is unlikely to yield reliable data, because the nature of the sharing
virtually precludes detailed awareness of the amount of soda each party is consuming. Marital
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expenditures for housing, utilities, furnishings, insurance, food, trans-
portation, vacations, taxes, support of children and clothing are un-
likely to favor one spouse over the other to a substantial degree. Even
in marital partnerships in which the spouses make a determined effort
to maintain spending authority over their individual income sources,
3
the benefits of marital expenditures will tend to be shared; any other
pattern would undermine communal living and ultimately destroy
most marital bonds. Full sharing is especially likely in two-job marital
partnerships, because financially independent spouses are unlikely to
tolerate any other pattern.
The reality, or perceived reality, of marital pooling is the economic
underpinning for the joint filing rule that has been a feature of the per-
sonal income tax in the United States since 1948.1 Under the joint
filing rule, husbands and wives are required (or induced by the promise
of lower taxes) to aggregate their individual income sources as a step in
the computation of their tax burden. Given the assumption of marital
pooling, aggregation of marital income is essential if the tax system is
to reflect systematically the real changes in an individual's personal
consumption and net change in savings that are thought to accompany
communal living. Because the sum of personal consumption and the
net change in savings is a traditional index of material well-being
under the income tax,6 the assumption of marital pooling supports a
formidable prima facie case for joint filing.7
income sharing may be less romantic, but the problem of monitoring the sharing patterns of mar-
ried couples parallels the problem of measuring the soda consumed by each lover in my example.
3. For equal income couples, whether each partner obtains half the community income by
spending out of one pot or by keeping control over his or her income sources is irrelevant for tax
policy purposes; the benefits enjoyed by each spouse are the same under both systems.
4. Some supporters of individual filing assert that an assumption of inequality between
spouses is less realistic with the changing status of women in society and with the increase in the
number of two-job couples. See, e.g., Munnell, The Couple Versus the Indvidual Under the Fed-
eral Personal Income Tax, in ECONOMICS OF TAXATION (M. Boskin & H. Aaron eds.) (to be
published by the Brookings Institution); H. Brazer, Income Tax Treatment of the Family (March
15, 1979) (copy on file in office of the North Carolina Law Review). The basis for that assertion is
unstated. Munnell feels that the increase in divorce also undermines the case for joint filing,
apparently on the ground that income pooling requires stable marriages. See Munnell, supra, at
4. Assessing tax on an annual basis seems to take care of the marriage stability concern. In fact,
the availability of divorce suggests that the number of women trapped in an unequal relationship
probably has diminished in recent years.
5. For a thorough discussion of the history of family taxation in the United States, see Bitt-
ker, Federal Income Taxation and the Family, 27 STAN. L. REv. 1389 (1975).
6. For the classic statement of the income concept, see H. SIMONS, PERSONAL INCOMP TAX-
ATION 59-102 (1938).
7. For the presentation and a detailed analysis of this argument, see McIntyre & Oldman,
Taxation of the Family in a Comprehensive and Simplifled Income Tax, 90 HARv. L. Rnv. 1573
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Promoters of the individual filing rule-the chief alternative to
joint filing-generally have failed to confront this prima facie case for
the joint filing rule.8 No serious effort has been made to challenge the
assumption of widespread marital pooling or to dispute its relevancy in
determining an individual's taxable capacity. Nor have the individual
filing advocates developed an affirmative theoretical justification for
their position. Instead, they have focused their attention on two as-
serted side effects of the joint filing rule. The first, analyzed in part I
below, is the allegedly bizarre set of rewards and penalties produced by
changes in marital status under a joint filing regime. The second, taken
up in part II, is the alleged discrimination produced by the joint filing
rule against secondary workers, the overwhelming majority of whom
are presumed to be wives working in paid employment outside the
home. These side effects, the argument goes, hopelessly discredit the
joint filing rule, leaving individual filing as the only viable choice.
My objective in this Article is to demonstrate the weakness of the
current case for the individual filing rule and to establish the essential
elements of any future arguments for individual filing worthy of serious
attention. I do not attempt to build a viable case for individual filing.
In the context of current economic and social conditions in the United
States, I doubt that a tenable case for individual filing is possible.
What I hope to do is to convince the proponents of an individual filing
rule that they must address seriously the tax policy implications of mar-
ital pooling if they are to join issue with their critics.
(1977). See also Hearings on the Tax Treatment of Married Couples and Single Persons Before the
House Comm. on Ways andMeans, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (statement of Robert S. McIntyre,
Public Citizen's Tax Reform Research Group, on "The 'Tax on Marriage' and Related Matters").
8. For recent articles championing an individual filing rule, see H. Brazer, supra note 4;
Gerzog, The Marriage Penaly: The Working Couples' Dilemma, 47 FORDHAM L. REv. 27 (1978)
(advocating voluntary individual filing for two-job couples); Munnell, supra note 4; Quester, Wo-
men's Behavior and the Tax Code, 59 Soc. Sc. Q. 665 (1979); Rosen, Is It Time to Abandon Joint
Filing, 30 NAT'L TAx J. 423 (1977); Wenig, Marital Status and Taxes, in UNMARRIED COUPLES
AND THE LAW 190-273 (G. Douthwaite ed. 1979).
In Canada, which has an individual filing rule, defenders of the status quo have challenged
the reality and significance of family sharing patterns. For a lively debate, see Taxation of the
Family, 1 CANADIAN TAXATION 4 (1979) (including London, The Family as the Basic Tax Unit,
id. at 4; Dulude, Joint Taxation of Spouses-A Feminist View, id. at 8; McIntyre, Economic Mutu-
ality and the Needfor Joint Filing, id. at 13; Dulude, McIntyre, London, Woodman, Lakey &
Wolfson, A Panel Discussion, id. at 16).
Some advocates of the community property system for marital property acknowledge, at least
implicitly, the fairness arguments for the joint filing rule. They would deny income splitting in
common law jurisdictions, however, in order to induce those jurisdictions to change their marital
property laws. Issues relating to the reform of marital property regimes are tax issues only inci-
dentally and are beyond the scope of this Article. For a discussion of these issues, see Bartke,
Marital Sharing-Wy Not Do It By Contract, 67 GEo. L.J. 1131, 1178 n. 323 (1979).
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I. MARRIAGE NEUTRALITY AND INDIVIDUAL FILING
An income tax that employs a joint filing rule cannot be marriage
neutral. The case for joint filing rests, first of all, on the premise that
married couples typically pool income and, second, on the premise that
the real changes in an individual's economic circumstances that are
produced by marital pooling should be reflected in determining a mar-
ried person's taxable capacity. A lack of marriage neutrality, therefore,
is not an embarrassment to the supporters of a joint filing rule. To join
issue with the advocates of joint filing, the supporters of an individual
filing rule cannot assume without argument that a marriage neutral tax
system is per se good. They must be prepared to challenge the proposi-
tion that married couples typically pool income, or show why that fact
should be ignored in a tax system that attempts to distribute burdens in
accordance with each individual's real income.
Joint filing advocates, of course, do not suggest that all types of
marriage nonneutrality, or even all the nonneutralities of current
United States law, are desirable. Few if any supporters of joint filing,
for example, favor the "tax on marriage" produced by the system of
multiple rate schedules under United States law. The "tax on mar-
riage" found in the tax regimes of many European countries, which
results from the combination of spousal income aggregation and only
one rate schedule, also is not favored.9 The only nonneutralities that
can be defended on principle are those that result from real or assumed
changes in a person's taxable capacity as a result of marriage or, of
course, divorce.
Two marriage nonneutralities of the income tax are commonly es-
poused by the advocates of a joint filing rule. The first is produced by
implementing a policy that requires married couples with equal income
to pay equal tax.' 0 For example, this policy would mandate that Terry
and Lee, a married couple, each with individual income sources of
$10,000, pay the same total tax as Pat and Jean, another married couple
who have respective net incomes of $5,000 and $15,000. This result,
which flows directly from a joint filing rule, is impossible under an in-
dividual filing system. The rationale for the result is that, for couples
pooling income sources, the taxable capacity of each partner is his or
her share of the total marital income, independent of the source of the
9. For a summary of the tax regimes of many European countries, see OR(OANISATION FOR
ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, THE TREATMENT OF FAMILY UNITS IN OECD
MEMBER COUNTRIES UNDER TAX AND TRANSFER SYSTEMS (1977).
10. See McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 7, at 1589-92.
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income. Even tax theorists favoring individual filing are comfortable
with this result." Moreover, the result has broad public support.
The second marriage nonneutrality favored by joint filing advo-
cates is the treatment under current United States law of alimony pay-
ments. Under Internal Revenue Code sections 71 and 215, alimony is
deductible by the payor and taxable to the recipient. This permits a
form of income splitting between formerly married persons, paralleling
the implicit income splitting afforded to married persons under the rate
schedule for married couples. 12 The justification for this treatment is
that the personal consumption and savings of the payor is reduced by
the alimony payment, while the consumption and savings of the payee
is concomitantly increased. This result also is a popular feature of the
United States tax laws among tax specialists and the public. In fact, all
the advocates of individual filing who have addressed this issue favor a
continuation of the alimony deduction.13
Given the apparent acceptability of at least some marriage non-
neutrality, the per se argument for a marriage neutral tax system is
hopelessly undercut. No tax regime can be advanced on the basis of a
principle that necessarily and systematically produces results that are
acknowledged to be unfair. Therefore, a plausible argument for in-
dividual filing based on marriage neutrality considerations must be far
less sweeping and more refined than the per se argument discredited
above.
Two lines of argument are still open to those who would defend
individual filing on marriage neutrality grounds. First of all, the two
nonneutralities discussed above are not the only ones produced under
the joint filing rule of current law. In addition, we have the infamous
"tax on marriage" imposed on many two-income married couples and
the frequently misunderstood "tax on remaining unmarried" imposed
on cohabiting persons with substantially unequal incomes who are
11. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 8, at 423. Some commentators, however, would favor une-
qual treatment of equal income spouses to offset the alleged benefits from household services of
one-job couples. See note 29 infra.
12. See I.R.C. §§ 71, 215. Under current law, the rate schedule for married couples implic-
itly assumes an income split between the spouses of approximately 85/15 for middle income tax-
payers. The rate schedule was constructed in accordance with a congressional mandate that the
tax burden on a single person not exceed 120% of the tax burden on two married persons with the
same aggregate income. For a fuller explanation of the implicit income splitting of current United
States law, see McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 7, at 1584-85. For a detailed description of the
implicit income splits at various income levels after the 1978 tax act, see Statement of Tax Reform
Research Group, supra note 7.
13. For example, none of the advocates of individual filing referred to in note 8 supra argue
against the alimony deduction.
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sharing income but are not married. These nonneutralities, one might
contend, are sufficiently important and unfair that they overcome the
acknowledged virtues of the joint filing rule. The merits of this conten-
tion and its common variations are discussed in subsection B below.
The second line of argument is based on the contention that an
individual's taxable capacity should be measured by the income he
earns or, in the case of property income, the income he controls by
ownership of an income-producing asset. Under this approach, mar-
riage neutrality would be mandated unless marriage resulted in a
change in ownership rights. Advocates of individual filing have as-
serted that this income attribution rule, which I call the property inter-
est rule, is correct as a matter of principle but have never revealed the
theoretical underpinning of the rule. In section A below, I articulate
both the foundation and the inadequacies of this asserted principle.
A. The Unsound Case for Attributing Income to the Earner
An unstated principle underlying the prima facie case for joint
filing set forth above is that the proper taxpayer on an item of income is
the person who uses or benefits from that income. If income is defined
as the sum of personal consumption and the net change in savings, this
principle would tax consumption to the consumer and savings to the
saver. More generally, the principle asserts that if income is used to
measure an individual's material well-being for tax purposes, the
proper taxpayer on an income item is the one whose material well-
being is increased by that income item.' 4 This benefit rule is compati-
ble with the property interest rule outside the family context because
for unattached individuals the "owner" of income and the "benefici-
ary" of income are typically the same person. For married couples,
however, the tax rules seem to be in conflict. 5 A refutation of the ben-
efit rule, therefore, appears to be a necessary precondition for develop-
ing a principled defense of the property interest rule. Supporters of the
property interest rule have not attempted this refutation, nor are they
likely to seriously challenge this fundamental and commonsensical
principle of taxation.
The property interest rule formulated above, nevertheless, need
not conflict with the benefit rule if we use a broad enough definition of
14. See McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 7, at 1592-99.
15. See id. at 1593.
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income. If we assume, as some economists suggest, that an individual's
income includes the value of all his or her human choices, measured by
market criteria, the apparent conflict between the benefit rule and the
property interest rule, at least within the family context, vanishes. Any-
one who earns income or owns an asset that produces income obviously
has exercised an economic choice when he or she shares that income
with a spouse. That choice may be required under a marriage contract
or, a la Mr. Earl in Lucas v. Earl,6 by a private contract. However we
identify the choice, a market analysis of marital behavior suggests that
a husband, for example, who shares his earnings with his wife reaps an
economic benefit from that sharing.' 7 Under market criteria, the value
of that choice is presumed to be the value of the money or other prop-
erty relinquished. It is the value of this choice, not the actual market
consumption or savings enjoyed by the donee spouse, that would be
taxed to the donor spouse under the property interest rule. Because the
donee spouse who actually spends or saves the income also exercises an
economic choice, pooled income or gifts would end up being taxed to
both the donor and the donee."8
What the above analysis suggests is that a principled defense of the
property interest rule is possible, but only if a defense is also provided
for taxing individuals on the value of their economic choices instead of
16. 281 U.S. 111 (1930).
17. A market analysis of family dealings has become commonplace. For a discussion of the
theory and references to the literature, see Sawhill, Economic Perspectives on the Family, DAEDA-
LUS, Spring 1977, at 115. The following statement by a prominent economist suggests an awaken-
ing of the economics profession to the dangers of inappropriately imposing an exchange model on
family transactions:
Economic analysis is very useful and does provide a number of insights even about
the behavior of marriage partners. I would only suggest that we may be beginning to
push market analysis beyond its functional limits in trying to find price surrogates for all
the activities of our waking hours, and in trying to explain everything in terms of eco-
nomic values. This is not a new idea, for both Karl Marx and Adam Smith would have
been horrified by the notion that the exchange process is the origin of all values. More-
over, this kind of reductionism is at variance with another tendency in economics-the
effort to broaden its concepts of accounting to include such concerns as the quality of life
and social responsibility of corporations. Besides, it may be a matter of great satisfaction
not to engage in cost accounting and quidpro quo exchanges in our leisure time and in
our close and informal relationships with other people.
Johnson, The Limits of Economic Analysis: Should We Try to Price Everything?, 4 J. INST.
SOCIOECON. STUD. 30, 40 (1979).
18. The "double taxation" of gifts has been viewed by many tax specialists as an inescapable
consequence of a comprehensive tax base. For an interesting discussion of recent developments,
see Head, The Simons-Carter Approach to Tax Policy: 4 Reappraisal, in WiRTscHAFTsWISSEN-
SCHAFT ALS GRUNDLAGE STAATLICHEN HANDELNS 191, 200-01 (P. Bohley & G. Tolkemitt eds.
1979). In my view, the double tax problem is avoided by treating the beneficiary as the proper
taxpayer and market consumption and savings as the proper object of taxation. See Dodge, Be-
yond Estate and Gift Tax Reform: Including Gifts and Bequests in Income, 91 HARV. L. REv. 1177,
1182-88 (1978); McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 7, at 1598 n.90.
1980] 475
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [
on the income they actually receive. In effect, the defense of the prop-
erty interest rule depends on first developing a justification for taxing
individuals on potential income. A tax on potential income is a popu-
lar plaything of the economics profession. It appeals to those econo-
mists who purport to place primary emphasis on the achievement of
efficiency in the design of an income tax. 9 They find some merit, for
example, in taxing people on the value of their leisure time on the the-
ory that a failure to tax leisure provides a tax incentive to those who
choose to do nothing in lieu of working in paid employment in the
taxable sector of the community. Our existing income tax, however, in
no way resembles a tax on potential income. Nor has any serious effort
been made to specify the tax base of a potential income tax, to over-
come the obvious obstacles to administering such a tax or to develop
any arguments concerning the fairness of such a tax. In sum, a case for
the property interest rule linked to the case for a tax on potential in-
come is no case at all, at least for the present.
B. Tax on Marriage and Other Nonneutra/ites as the Basisfor
Indiidual Filing
Much of the criticism of the current program of family taxation in
the United States is directed at the so-called "tax on marriage" that
arises because two married persons, each with substantial individual
income sources, generally would pay less tax if they got a divorce and
filed as single persons. Although a variety of features of the tax code
can produce this phenomenon, most have nothing to do, by everyone's
admission, with the choice between joint and individual filing.2 0 Of
19. The champions of the so-called optimal tax theory generally treat efficiency as the princi-
pal goal of the income tax. Their search for efficiency requires a quantification of all nonmarket
choices, including leisure. For a statement of the efficiency goal and references to this expanding
literature, see Rosen, A4pplieation of Optimal Tax Theory to Problems in Taxing Families and ldi.
viduals, in 1 COMPILATION OF OTA PAPERS (Office of Tax Analysis, U.S. Dep't of the Treasury,
Paper 21, 1976).
The case for a tax on potential income has some similarities to the case made by some econo-
mists for a consumption tax. For a discussion of the common roots of the tax on consumption and
the tax on potential income and a criticism of both, see McIntyre, Book Review, 26 WAYNE! L. R.
1181 (1980).
20. The various marriage penalties of current United States law are summarized in H.
Brazer, supra note 4.
The House Ways and Means Committee held hearings on the tax treatment of married and
single persons on April 2-3, 1980. In anticipation of those hearings, the Staff of the Joint Com-
mittee on Taxation published a 68 page report, JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 96th CONG. 2D SESS.,
THE INCOME TAX TREATMENT OF MARRIED COUPLES AND SINGLE PERSONS (Comm. Print 1980)
[hereinafter cited as JOINT COMMITTEE REPORT], that summarized some of the proposals for solv-
ing the "tax on marriage" problem. Curiously, the Report virtually omitted any reference to in-
come splitting as a solution to that problem.
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those relevant to the subject matter of this Article, the most talked
about cause of the tax on marriage derives from the introduction of
special rate schedules for single persons by the 1969 tax act. Propo-
nents of individual filing claim that the fairest way to eliminate this tax
on marriage would be for the United States to return to the pre-1948
system of individual filing with one rate schedule. In subsection 1 be-
low, I analyze that claim and demonstrate its serious weaknesses. I
then discuss, in subsection 2, the related claim that the joint filing rule
is unfair to certain single persons by imposing on them a penalty for
failing to marry.
1. Marriage Neutrality and the Married Person
Most tax theorists would agree that the tax on marriage is an un-
happy feature of the United States system of family taxation. No con-
vincing tax policy argument has been advanced for placing a higher tax
burden on cohabiting couples who marry than on those who live to-
gether in a less formal relationship.2" Nor do social policy concerns
support the tax on marriage. The joint filing rule need not be aban-
doned, however, in order to deal with the tax on marriage problem. A
system of joint filing with full income splitting, as was adopted in the
United States in 1948, completely eliminates the tax on marriage.
Within the context of the current United States system of multiple rate
schedules, the tax on marriage could be substantially eliminated for
most two-income couples through the granting of a special marital al-
lowance for the second earner.22 Therefore, the case for individual
filing based on the tax on marriage problem requires a showing that the
solution under an individual filing rule is superior to those available
under the joint filing rule.
As its advocates assert, an individual filing rule could end the tax
on marriage caused by the multiple rate schedules of current United
States law. It would not produce, however, a marriage neutral rate
21. For a summary and criticism of the defenses of the tax on marriage, see Bittker, supra
note 5, at 1419-28. See also Gerzog, supra note 8, at 31-36.
22. Several proposals for a special deduction are explained in McIntyre, TakingAccount of
Marriage, PEOPLE & TAXES, October 1977, at 3-6. A special credit is advocated in Z. Giraldo,
Tax Policy and the Dual-Income Family: The "Marriage Tax" and Other Inequities, at 3-9 to 3-
13 (Center for the Study of the Family and the State, Institute of Policy Sciences and Public
Affairs, Duke University 1978). Giraldo concludes that income splitting and the problem of geo-
graphical nonneutrality make an individual filing election undesirable. She refutes the argument
that these problems are less intractable now than they proved to be prior to 1948. Id. at 3-5 to 3-8.
Rosen has suggested that the problems have been solved in Canada. See Rosen, supra note 8, at
428 n. 10. For a pointed rebuttal, see Bird, On the Importance of Tax Details: Joint vs. Individual
Filing, 31 NAT'L TAX J. 203 (1977).
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structure unless the deduction permitted for alimony payments were
eliminated as well. Under current United States law, and under any
system of individual filing with an alimony deduction, two unmarried
persons with substantially unequal individual income sources could re-
duce their total tax bill by marrying, getting a divorce and then equaliz-
ing their taxable incomes through alimony payments.2 3 For example, if
Pat, with income of $15,000, married and then divorced Lee, with in-
come of $5,000, an alimony payment of $5,000 paid by Pat to Lee
would leave the couple with equal taxable incomes, the optimum posi-
tion for unmarried couples who are being taxed individually under a
progressive rate schedule.
The tax on marriage produced by the alimony deduction is the
mirror image of the more famous tax on marriage produced by the
multiple rate schedules of current United States law. The chief victims
of the alimony tax on marriage are one-income couples and other
couples with substantially unequal incomes. Equal income couples,
who pay the maximum tax on marriage produced by the multiple rate
schedules, suffer no tax on marriage from the alimony deduction.
As discussed above, the alimony deduction is a popular feature of
our tax laws, which even the champions of a marriage neutral tax sys-
tem seem unwilling to abandon. Assuming the permanence of the ali-
mony deduction, those advocates of individual filing who have been
most uncompromising in their call for an end to the tax on marriage
have actually been touting a system they condemn-joint filing with
full income splitting. Every other tax regime has to tolerate a tax on
marriage, at least to some extent.
The analysis above debunks much of the tax on marriage rhetoric
that has been marshalled for an individual filing rule. Two lines of
argument, both unpromising, remain open to those who would pursue
an individual filing solution to the marriage penalty. First, one might
develop a principled basis for abandoning the alimony deduction.
Without the alimony deduction to contend with, the supporters of in-
dividual filing at least could claim that their favored tax regime would
end the tax on marriage problem. Because the alimony deduction is a
necessary corollary of the benefit rule, a principled attack on the ali-
mony deduction most likely would require a defense of the property
interest rule for attributing income to individual taxpayers. The
23. For a full explanation of this alimony tax on marriage, including a table showing the
amount of the penalty, see Wenig, supra note 8, at 257-59, 261.
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argument for the property interest rule is discussed and rejected in sec-
tion I A above.
The other line of argument involves a direct appeal to social policy
goals independent of traditional tax policy concerns. In effect, the pro-
ponents of individual filing would concede, arguendo, that joint filing is
the correct tax policy choice, but would contend, nevertheless, that the
assumed cost in tax equity from the individual filing rule is more than
offset by some social policy gains produced by individual filing. This
argument is similar to those often made for tax incentives in that the
special deduction, credit or other allowance that constitutes the incen-
tive is said to produce economic or social benefits that outweigh the
departure from accepted notions of tax fairness.24 The crux of this so-
cial policy argument would be a comparison of the social consequences
of an individual filing rule, including the cost in fairness and the social
cost of the alimony tax on marriage, with the social consequences of the
various alternative tax regimes that employ a joint filing rule.25 The
beginning of the argument would be a comparison of the social conse-
quences of the alimony tax on marriage under individual filing with the
consequences of the more famous tax on marriage under the various
joint filing regimes. Because the consequences of both marriage penal-
ties probably are modest, a quick victory for either approach on mar-
riage neutrality grounds is unlikely. The argument, therefore, would
have to be expanded to consider the panoply of social consequences of
each of the many tax regimes possible under an individual filing rule
and under a joint filing rule. Supporters of individual filing thus far
have not even attempted to pursue this complex and exceedingly diffi-
cult undertaking.
2. Marriage Neutrality and the Single Person
An apparent defect of the joint filing rule is that it applies only to
married persons, although the reason for the rule-the economic conse-
quences of income pooling-would justify joint filing for some unmar-
ried couples as well. As a result, one-income unmarried couples (and
other unmarried couples with substantially unequal individual income
sources) pay higher taxes under a tax regime employing a joint filing
24. For a discussion of the use of tax expenditure concepts to analyze social policy arguments
made on behalf of tax rules, see McIntyre, A Solution to the Problem of Dfning a Tax Expendi-
ture, 14 U.C.D.L. REv. 427 (1980).
25. The calculus should include the administrative costs of policing income-splitting arrange-
ments and the social cost of a loss of geographical neutrality. For a discussion of these problems,
see Z. Giraldo, supra note 22, at 3-5 to 3-7.
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rule than the fairness criteria implicit in the joint filing rule would sup-
port. The reason for this result is obviously one of administration. Be-
cause the tax administration cannot be put in the position of verifying
the actual sharing patterns of couples, marriage is used as the bright
line test for pooling arrangements.26
A compromise with a normative tax rule for administrative rea-
sons need not discredit a tax rule; otherwise, no administratively feasi-
ble tax system could be justified. The case for abandoning joint filing
because of the plight of certain unmarried couples requires a showing
that an alternative tax regime employing an individual filing rule
would be a better approximation of the assumed ideal than a joint
filing regime that used marriage (or some alternative) as a prerequisite
for income pooling. Because all sharing patterns are ignored systemati-
cally under an individual filing rule, however, it would be mere hap-
penstance if an individual filing regime were a second best solution to
the problem of accounting for the economic consequences of income
pooling.
As a practical matter, individual filing would be a plausible second
best response to the economic consequences of income pooling only if
pooling were a way of life for most married and unmarried persons.
To take the extreme, if everyone were pooling with someone, then ig-
noring all pooling arrangements would give a fairer result than using
marriage as the prerequisite for pooling. Income pooling outside of
marriage, however, is unlikely to become a way of life for significant
numbers of individuals, requiring as it does the subordination of indi-
vidual economic welfare to that of the household.
In estimating the extent of income pooling outside of marriage, we
must not equate cost-sharing arrangements with income pooling. Cost
sharing is indeed common; friends, lovers, relatives, even virtual stran-
gers often agree to join a household and share common expenses. The
crux of income pooling, however, is the equalization of benefits for
26. Bittker argues that the group whose income is to be consolidated should be delineated by
boundary lines that can be "crisply defined and readily verified." Bittker, supra note 5, at 1399.
Marriage, of course, satisfies these criteria.
According to recent census data, 1.3 million households in 1979 were shared by unrelated
adults of the opposite sex; these households contained 2.7 million unmarried partners. For the
same year, 96.5 million men and women were married and living with their spouses. Thus, the
unmarried partners represented only about 3% of all persons living together as couples in 1979,
The census data do not contain information on the number of unrelated adults of the same sex
living together. Nor do they show the extent of pooling among unmarried couples. See BUREAU
OF THE CENSUS, CURRENT POPULATION REPORTS, No. 349, at 20 (1980), quotedin JOINT COM-
MVrrEE REPORT, supra note 20, at 27-28.
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each member of the pool. Whether or not unmarried housemates typi-
cally agree to equalize unequal incomes -has little to do with thb phe-
nomenon of cost sharing.
In addition to its alleged failure to acgount properly for the pool-
ing of income by unmarried persons, some critics complain that the
joint filing rule provides an irrational incentive to single persons who
do not have a housemate to go find one and get married." In their
view, marriage gives a tax bonanza to unattached individuals who find
and marry someone with little or no income. For example, if Adrian,
an individual with wages of $20,000, seeks out and marries Fran, who
has no income sources, Adrian's taxes would go down under most tax
regimes employing a joint filing rule. This tax savings is said to make
the lower income spouse, typically the wife, a tax shelter for the hus-
band.
This tax reduction by marriage is not a necessary consequence of
joint filing. The mandatory joint return with only one rate schedule, a
system once common in Europe and still operating in the Philippines,
provides no rate advantage for persons who marry.28 Any joint filing
system that provides for full or partial income spliting, however,
27. See, e.g., Mess, For Richer, For Poorer: Federal Taxation and Marriage, 28 CATH. U.L.
REv. 87, 90-91 (1978).
The alleged incentive may be viewed from two perspectives. Some commentators do not
view a spouse who has no independent income sources as a legitimate taxpayer. P. STERN, THE
RAPE OF THE TAXPAYER (1973), for example, speaks of "the little woman" as a valuable "asset" of
the husband. A tax wise single person, according to this perspective, can "purchase" this asset and
reap a tax bonanza. From another perspective, the unattached single person always has a phan-
tom partner on the hook, ready to materialize whenever the single person wants to make the tax
wise decision to marry. The single person always has a tax incentive to marry the phantom, since
a hypothetical mate does not in fact reduce the single persons's real consumption and savings (i.e.
income). Michael Moss, for example, illustrates the "disgimination" against single persons by
showing how much less tax a single person, X, would pay if X married another single person, Z.
Moss, supra note 27, at 92 n.20. If Z were a real person sharing income with X prior to the
marriage, we have the "tax on remaining unmarried" discussed above. As long as Z remains a
figment of the imagination, however, Z does not represent any drain on X's resources. For a
similar perspective, see Hearings on the Tax Treatment ofMarried Couples and Single Persons
Be/ore the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1980) (statement of Emil
Sunley, Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Treasury, on the tax treatment of married and single
taxpayers), reprinted in Treasury Dep't News, April 2, 1980, at 8.
28. The mandatory joint return with only one rate schedule is, in my view, the least fair
system of family taxation commonly discussed. In a society that strives for equality between the
sexes, it is particularly inappropriate because it forces two married people to pay tax as if they
were one individual. Full or partial income splitting, of course, recognizes the separate tax status
of each spouse. Historically, the mandatory joint return with one rate schedule was a response to
property rules giving management of marital income to the husband. In effect, that system is a
form of individual filing, with all marital income attributed to the husband in accord with local
property law.
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always produces a tax savings when a high income person marries a
lower income person.
The wife as tax shelter argument, nevertheless, is faulty because it
misapprehends the relationship between the joint filing rule and a pro-
gressive rate structure. Under joint filing with income splitting, mar-
ried persons are assumed to be sharing their incomes. In the example
above, once Adrian and Fran married, their individual circumstances
presumably would change. With full income splitting, half of Adrian's
income of $20,000 would go for the benefit of Fran. Under a progres-
sive rate structure, the tax on two individuals, each with $10,000 of
income, is lower, by definition, than the tax on one individual with an
income of $20,000. If the tax regime assumed that splitting were less
even than a 50/50 split, as is assumed implicitly by the United States
system of multiple rate schedules, the tax savings from marriage would
be reduced, but the rationale would be the same. Individuals whose
income goes down, whether by marriage or otherwise, ought to pay less
tax than they did at their higher income level.
II. THE ALLEGED DISCRIMINATION OF THE JOINT FILING RULE
AGAINST WORKING WIVES
Much of the support for individual filing comes from those who
see the joint filing rule as discouraging married women from working
outside the home. In section A below, I examine that disincentive
claim from the perspective of an individual contemplating entry into
the labor market. In section B, I analyze that claim in light of the eco-
nomic literature on the labor supply response of married women to
taxes.29
A. Some Commonsense Objections to the Discrimination Charge
At first blush, the claim that joint filing discriminates against wives
working outside the home appears frivolous, even mischievous.30 As
discussed in part I above, the intent of joint filing is to tax married
29. I do not discuss in the text the economic literature that purports to show that the failure
to tax imputed income from self-performed household services biases the tax system against wo-
men who want to work in paid employment outside the home. The issue of what nonmarket items
to include in the tax base arises under both individual filing and joint filing regimes. For the case
against taxing self-performed services, see McIntyre & Oldman, .Sgra note 7, at 1607-24. The
defects of individual filing as a second best response to the imputed income issue are addressed in
id. at 1623-24.
30. In light of the sensitivity of men and women in the United States to real and perceived
gender-based discrimination, a false claim of gender bias is indeed mischievous.
[Vol. 58
INDIVIDUAL FILING
persons, male and female, on their material well-being, as measured by
the income they actually enjoy, without regard for the source of the
income or, incidentally, the sex of the beneficiary. In operation, joint
filing necessarily applies in exactly the same way to husbands and
wives; by definition, for every husband who files a joint tax return,
there is a wife doing likewise. In operation and intent, therefore, the
joint filing rule is gender neutral.
Fair-minded critics of joint filing concede, as they must, that the
rule itself is gender neutral. They contend, nevertheless, that, under
current social and economic conditions, joint filing acts as a disincen-
tive for married women to work outside the home. Married persons,
they assert, typically view the husband as the person primarily respon-
sible for support of the household. Therefore, whatever work decision
the wife may make, the husband will work anyway. Because of this
perspective, many married women allegedly see any income they may
earn as the marginal marital income. Consequently, under joint filing,
they perceive themselves as taxed on the first dollar of income they
earn at the rate applicable to the last dollar of their husband's earn-
ings.3'
This disincentive argument against joint filing must be refined sub-
stantially before it can provide any support for an individual filing rule.
A fundamental weakness of the argument is illustrated by the following
example. Assume we have a farmer, Mr. F, who grows wheat that he
can sell for a profit of $1,000 per bag. Assume that he has the capacity
to produce 100 bags of wheat a year. Assume further that profits from
31. For alternative versions of this argument, see Boskin, The Effects of Government Expendi-
tures and Taxes on Female Labor, AM. ECON. REv., May 1974, at 251, 254; Quester, supra note 8,
at 670; Rosen, Tax Illusion and the Labor Supply of Married Women, 58 REv. EcoN. & STAT. 167
(1976); P. Musgrave, Women and Taxation (paper presented to Congress of International Institute
of Public Finance, September 1979). No evidence is offered to show that the wife is the marginal
taxpayer. Rosen, for example, simply states that "in this paper we follow the reasoning of Bowen
and Finegan: 'It seems reasonable to suppose that in most families the (potential) earnings of the
wife are more "marginal" than the earnings of the husband and that the marginal tax rate to
which the family is subject is therefore viewed as being particularly applicable to the wife's earn-
ings."' Rosen, supra, at 167 n.2 (quoting W. BowEN & T. FINEGAN, THE ECONOMICS OF LABOR
FORCE PARTICIPATION 136 (1969)) (emphasis added). For a more lengthy discussion, see Quester,
supra note 8, at 670-71. Quester contends that "sex discrimination in earnings implies that the
average couple will be better off if it is the husband, rather than the wife, who works full-time in
the market . I. " d. at 671. From this observation, she concludes that the husband is the pri-
mary earner and the wife pays the marginal tax. Id. Under Quester's thesis, the high marginal
rate facing the wife could be avoided if the wife refused to file a joint return, and elected instead to
use the individual schedule of I.R.C. § l(d). This action, of course, is unlikely because it would
reduce the net income of the couple and, therefore, the wife's net income. That wives almost
universally elect to file the joint return rather than use the pre-1969 singles' rate schedule is solid
evidence that the wife is not forced to pay the marginal tax.
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the sale of the wheat are taxed for the first $50,000 of income at 20%
and at 50% for the remainder. Assume finally that Mr. F, for purposes
of his own, puts his wheat in blue bags until he has 50 bags full and
then puts the wheat in pink bags.
From the point of view of Mr. F, the progressive rate structure
discourages the production of pink bags of wheat, for his after tax re-
turn on a pink bag is $500, while his net return on a blue bag is $800.
That perspective, of course, is nonsensical. The tax system treats all
wheat profits alike. It is Mr. F who, for idiosyncratic reasons, identifies
pink bags as the bags at the margin.
The tax system, similarly, treats all marital income alike. If a mar-
ried woman, because of a stereotyped view of marriage, views herself
as the marginal worker, we might bemoan the social conventions that
have encouraged that perspective, but we have no cause for complaint
against the tax system. The assumption of joint filing is that married
couples pool income. For marital partners who are pooling income,
taxes reduce the resources of the marital community available for shar-
ing. If splitting is on a 50/50 basis, the real burden of any tax on the
couple is shared equally by the spouses. For married couples who are
not pooling, the burden of the tax on the community will be a matter of
negotiation. Given the option of divorce, few wives are likely to bar-
gain so poorly as to end up paying tax at the top marginal rates appli-
cable to the couple.
Another weakness in the disincentive argument against joint filing
is the lack of data showing that most married women working outside
the home perceive themselves, albeit incorrectly, as paying tax as the
marginal worker. The plausibility of alternative perceptions is illus-
trated by the following example. Assume that H, the husband, and W,
the wife, are married, that H has wage income of $20,000, that W has
wage income of $10,000 and that H and W have income from a joint
savings account of $500. During the year, H and W are both subject to
withholding at the source on their wages; because of his higher income
level, H has substantially more withheld than W. Nothing is withheld,
of course, on the interest income. When the joint return is filed in
April, H and W get a tax refund of $100. Under these conditions, is W
likely to perceive herself as paying a substantial part of the taxes with-
held from H's salary? Would the perception be likely to change if H
and W had to make a tax payment in April of $500?
The weaknesses in the disincentive argument against joint filing
illustrated above appear to be fatal ones. If married couples pool in-
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come, the real burden of the tax on either spouse necessarily is borne in
fact by the community. Even if pooling is incomplete, the withholding
of taxes at the source on wage income makes it improbable that the
working wife will be forced to pay the taxes already withheld from the
husband.
Whether wivesperceive the joint filing rule as imposing a disincen-
tive to work is difficult to resolve conclusively.3 2 Even if a substantial
number of married women do suffer from this false perception, how-
ever, a repeal of the joint filing rule, unless justified on other grounds, is
hardly an appropriate response. To call for a repeal of joint filing on
that ground is in effect to call for a tax subsidy for husbands and wives
with a stereotyped view of marriage.
B. Labor Supply Response of Married Women to Taxes as an
Argument Against Joint Filing
Over the past decade, economists have attempted to estimate the
work response of husbands and wives to changes in income and social
security tax rates. Measuring the work response of married persons has
turned out to be a complex endeavor. Economic theory would predict
the following labor supply responses of married persons to increases in
taxes: (1) hours worked would decrease because the reduction in the
net return from paid labor would make other uses of time relatively
more attractive (the "substitution" effect); (2) hours worked would in-
crease because a married couple with fixed budget needs would have to
work more hours to satisfy those needs (the "income" effect); and (3)
hours worked by the husband would increase and hours worked by the
wife would decrease, or vice versa (the "cross-substitution" and "cross-
32. Rosen has attempted to determine the labor response of married women and concludes,
with some qualifications, that "Im]arried women do in fact seem to react to tax rates in the 'ra-
tional' manner of standard economic theory." Rosen, supra note 31, at 170. This study, however,
does not test the working woman's perception of the effect of joint filing. Rosen "assumed for
simplicity that the husband's work effort is fixed institutionally and there are no cross-substitution
effects." Id. at 169. The tax rules used in his calculations are based on the assumption that "the
wife is in effect taxed at the same marginal rate as the last dollar earned by the husband." Id. at
167. See also Rosen, Taxes in a Labor Supply Model with Joint Wage-Hours Determination, 44
ECONOMETRicA 485 (1976).
In the United Kingdom, the Inland Revenue Department recently announced a change in the
treatment of married women under the tax department's withholding mechanism. Under the cur-
rent practice, the full marital allowance is allocated to the husband, with the result that the entire
wages of the wife are subject to withholding. Under the new procedure, the marital allowance will
be allocated to the wife, unless it appears that the wife's earnings will exceed the husband's or the
couple requests that the wife be treated as the marginal worker. This change does not affect the
total tax burden imposed on the couple; it may, however, change perceptions about the distribu-
tion of the burden between spouses. INLAND REVENUE PREss RELEASE, Dec. 4, 1979.
1980]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
income" effects). Economic theory says nothing about the overall im-
pact of these responses.
33
Empirical studies are likewise inconclusive. A number of studies
indicate that wives respond to higher taxes by reducing their hours of
work. Husbands tend to have an opposite but less pronounced reac-
tion.34 These reactions, however, may be cancelled out by the cross
responses. One recent study found, for example, that the cross effects
produce an overall increase in the labor supply as a result of an in-
crease in taxes.35 Earlier studies found the cross effects to be less sub-
stantial.36 These earlier studies, however, assumed that the wife was
the marginal taxpayer in the marital partnership, a perspective that was
discredited in section A above.37
Some supporters of individual filing contend, nevertheless, that the
labor supply literature provides a basis for favoring an individual filing
rule. Some commentators read the literature as showing that joint
filing is inefficient in that it allegedly reduces the supply of economic
goods and services that otherwise would be produced.38 Others claim it
shows that joint filing perpetuates traditional husband/wife role pat-
terns because it encourages women who otherwise would choose to
work outside the home to stay at home.39 Neither of these readings of
the literature is accurate.
First, the supporters of individual filing rely on studies of the labor
supply response to family taxation that measure only the economic re-
sponses at the margin of women already in the labor force. None of
these studies claims to measure the effect of taxes on the decision to
33. For a more technical description of these effects, see Rosen, supra note 19.
34. See, e.g., Hall, Wages, Income, and Hours of Work in the U.S. Labor Force, in INCOME
MAINTENANCE AND LABOR SUPPLY 102 (G. Cain & H. Watts eds. 1973).
35. See Leuthold, Taxes and the Two-Earner Family" Impact on the Work Decision, 7 Pun.
FINANCE Q. 147, 154-56 (1979).
36. See, e.g., Boskin, The Economics of Labor Supply, in INCOME MAINTENANCE AND LABOR
SUPPLY 163 (G. Cain & H. Watts eds. 1973).
37. See text accompanying notes 30-32 supra.
38. See, e.g., Rosen, supra note 19, at 11. Rosen notes that individual filing also would be
inefficient. The optimal result, from an efficiency perspective, would give a large tax benefit to
high income working wives, a modest tax benefit to upper middle class working wives and no
benefit to lower income persons.
39. See, e.g., Quester, supra note 8, at 673. See also P. Musgrave, supra note 31, at 2, 4.
Musgrave suggests that the tax code produces a "doll house" effect by reflecting and reinforcing a
dependent status for women. Id. at 1-2. In Henrik Ibsen's .4 Doll's House, we may recall that
Nora ultimately was liberated through increased self-awareness, not through an amendment to the
Norwegian tax code. Musgrave does not suggest that joint filing necessarily collides with the
interests of women; her conclusion is that joint filing should be retained, with some special al-
lowances for working wives. Id. at 10.
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enter the labor market.40 Since 1940, the percentage of married women
in the labor force has increased from under seventeen percent to nearly
fifty percent. Participation of unmarried women has also increased
substantially during this period, but at a less rapid rate.4' These data
provide some basis for believing that taxes are not a significant barrier
to married women who desire to enter the labor market.42 These
figures show nothing, however, about the effect of taxes at the margin
on hours worked by married women.
43
Second, the consistent finding of the studies that women are more
tax sensitive than men does not show that the joint filing rule is ineffi-
cient. Whether a tax provision is inefficient depends on the overall ef-
fects of the provision on the production of economic goods and
services. The cross effects of the joint filing rule must be considered,
therefore, in determining its efficiency. As stated above, one recent
study found the overall job response of married couples to a marginal
change in taxes to be positive-a marginal increase in taxes would in-
crease the total hours worked, and a decrease in taxes would decrease
hours worked. 44 Earlier studies have reached the opposite conclusion,
40. Measurement of the labor response of women is based on data collected by the Bureau of
Labor Statustics from two sources: a sample survey of households using interview techniques and
questionnaires submitted by employers. See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LA-
BOR, EMPLOYMENT AND EARNINGS: JANUARY 1979, at 203 (1979). No data, obviously, is avail-
able on the value of self-performed services. For a description of the problem of defining self-
performed services, see McIntyre & Oldman, supra note 7, at 1609-13. Attempts have been made
to quantify the value of self-performed services, but the estimates necessarily are crude and reveal
nothing about marginal values. See Rosen, supra note 31, at 169. Even if data were available, the
decision to enter the labor force cannot be comprehended by comparing the marginal return from
a job in the labor market to the marginal return from housework. The decision to enter the labor
force is different in kind from the decision of someone in the labor market to work an additional
hour.
41. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 404
(table 655) (99th ed. 1978).
42. Needless to say, these figures do not demonstrate that taxes have had no effect on the
decision of married women to enter the labor market; perhaps the growth in the participation rate
would have been higher or lower under an alternative regime.
43. A finding that the United States tax system poses a significant barrier to women entering
the labor market would have important political implications; a finding that taxes merely affect
the number of hours worked by part-time female workers probably would have no political im-
pact. An entrance barrier suggests the tax law is locking women in the home; an effect on hours
worked means at most that the tax law is inducing women employees to go home a little early.
44. See Leuthold, supra note 35, at 158-59. The author states:
The results of this study are interesting in light of recent Administration proposals
to amend federal income tax treatment of two-earner families to reduce the so-called
marriage penalty in the tax code. As a result of the marriage penalty, two-earner fami-
lies often find their tax liabilities higher than if they were to divorce and be taxed as two
single taxpayers. To the extent that reforms to reduce the marriage penalty also lower
the marginal rate of tax on two-earer families, the results of this study suggest that
hours of work and the division of work between the husband and wife will be affected.
According to the results of this study, a reduction in the marginal rate of income tax on
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but those studies were tainted by the false assumption that the tax-sen-
sitive wife pays at the highest marginal rates imposed on the marital
partnership.45
This discussion of the efficiency ofjoint filing has proceeded under
the implicit assumption that efficiency is an appropriate standard for
measuring the worth of a tax rule. That assumption, however, is un-
warranted. Throughout the income tax history of the United States,
fairness has been the primary value to be maximized.4 6 In many con-
texts, fairness and efficiency are complementary, but when efficiency is
a function of the tax sensitivity of groups of taxpayers, the two criteria
are at war. A system that permits women to pay less tax than men,
single persons less than married ones, blacks less than whites or old less
than young47 because of differences in their feelings about taxes seems
monstrously unfair and, incidentally, an invitation to chaos in the tax
laws. Such madness, however, is a logical consequence of building a
personal income tax on efficiency principles. 8
III. CONCLUSION
The case for joint filing would be overwhelming if marriage were
always a true partnership, with each spouse sharing equally in the
two-earner families can be expected to cause a realignment of work responsibilities
within two-earner families with wives working a larger share and husbands a smaller
share of total family labor time. At the same time, total family labor time can be ex-
pected to decrease for white families and remain unchanged for black families.
45. See text accompanying notes 33-39 .tura.
46. The political support for the 16th amendment to the United States Constitution, for ex-
ample, is explainable on fairness, rather than efficiency grounds. Historically, efficiency criteria
have been important when fairness criteria provided no guidance or the efficiency effects were
very substantial. For discussion of the historical preeminence of fairness criteria among followers
of Henry Simons, see Head, supra note 18, at 193-95.
47. Leuthold found, for example, that "an increase in the marginal tax rate leads white fami-
lies to work longer hours and black families to work shorter hours in total." Leuthold, supra note
35, at 156.
48. The statement in the text puts me at odds with those who would restructure the United
States income tax according to so-called optimal tax theory criteria. The optimal tax theory litera-
ture has attempted to ascertain how the tax rules could be rewritten to minimize changes in behav-
ior in response to the tax. If data were sufficient to carry out the enterprise and if a cost-free tax
administration could be obtained, the optimal tax theorists would be able to construct a tax that
was paid exclusively by those without the economic power to shift any portion of the tax. The tax
so constructed would be an "optimal" tax system!
For a friendly lampoon of the optimal tax theory, see McIntyre (a.k.a. Walter T. McDuck),
Optimal Tax Act Passes: Income Tax Replaced by Lump Sum Levy, TAX NOTES, April 2, 1980.
That piece points out that an optimal tax payable in coin is nonneutral when applied to
nonmarket income, since a person working in the nonmarket sector cannot pay the tax without
shifting to the market sector, whatever his preference for nonmarket income. For example, the
British once imposed a lump sum levy on blacks in the nonmarket agricultural sector in order to
force them to take paying jobs in the South African diamond mines.
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marital income by voluntary agreement, reinforced by community
property law. In contrast, individual filing would be the obvious rule if
married persons typically had no common economic interests and shar-
ing was rare. In the United States and many other countries, marital
relationships are characterized by widespread but not universal shar-
ing, with limited reinforcement by local property law. This untidy situ-
ation is the root cause of the legitimate debate over the proper tax effect
of family circumstances.
Most of those arguing in favor of individual filing, nevertheless,
fail to address the issue of marital sharing or address it only tangen-
tially. This Article demonstrates the inadequacy of that approach.

